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I. INTRODUCTION 
When is a whistleblower not a “whistleblower?”  The Supreme 
Court will address this very question in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. 
Somers.1  The Court will examine the issue of whether an employee who 
reports internally about violations of the securities laws, but does not 
report the violation to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
qualifies as a whistleblower under the anti-retaliation provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of  2010 
(“Dodd-Frank”).2  The Court granted certiorari in Digital Realty Trust to 
resolve a split between the federal Courts of Appeal concerning the 
proper application of the definition of “whistleblower” under Section 
21F, “Whistleblower Incentives and Protection,” of Dodd-Frank to the 
statute’s anti-retaliation provisions.  At issue is subsection 21F(a)(6), 
which defines whistleblower to mean any individual who provides 
information regarding securities violations to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and subsection 21F(h)(A)(iii) of the 
anti-retaliation provisions, which cross references the relevant provisions 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”),3 which does not 
require external reporting to the SEC.4 
In Digital Realty Trust, Paul Somers, a vice president of portfolio 
management, filed suit under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions, 
against his employer, Digital Realty Trust, Inc., a publicly traded real-
estate investment trust company, and a senior vice president for human 
resources.5  Somers alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for 
reporting to Digital Realty’s senior management that his supervisor had 
engaged in certain corporate actions in violation of Sarbanes-Oxley.  The 
district court denied Digital Realty’s motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim, rejecting Digital’s assertion that the anti-retaliation provision 
under Dodd-Frank did not apply to this case because Somers was not a 
whistleblower under the meaning of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower 
provision since he did not report the alleged conduct to the SEC.6  
Recognizing a split in authority, the district court certified its order for 
interlocutory review.7  After granting interlocutory review, a divided 
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
 
 1  Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 2300 (mem.) (June 26, 2017) (No. 16-1276). 
 2  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(21F). 
 3  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 4  § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002). 
 5  Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 6  Id. at 1092. 
 7  Id. at 1108. 
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court’s decision.8  Concluding that the statutory definition of 
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank was not dispositive, the Ninth Circuit 
ultimately decided that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision provides 
protection to those employees who report to the SEC and who report 
internally under Sarbanes-Oxley and other federal laws.9  The Supreme 
Court granted Digital Realty’s petition for a writ of certiorari, to resolve 
what Digital Realty asserted was “a clear and intractable conflict on an 
important and recurring question of statutory interpretation.”10 
Until recently, the Supreme Court had not addressed the scope of the 
anti-retaliation provisions under Dodd-Frank.  However, as discussed 
below, the circuit courts had dealt with this issue with varying results.  
The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), held that the anti-
retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank creates a private cause of action only 
for those employees who make their disclosure to the SEC.11  The 
plaintiff did not seek certiorari in that case.  In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy,12 
the Second Circuit, finding Chevron deference appropriate, held that the 
Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions extended to employees who did 
not submit their complaint to the SEC, but instead reported violations 
internally or to another governmental authority.  The defendant in 
Berman also declined to seek certiorari.13  More recently, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in a Sixth Circuit case, Verble v. Morgan Stanley 
Smith Barney.14  In that case, the Sixth Circuit granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss an alleged retaliation claim on the grounds that the 
employee failed to state sufficient facts for a “plausible claim for relief” 
under Dodd-Frank.15  The Sixth Circuit did not reach the interpretive 
question concerning the definition of whistleblower.16  In Digital Realty 
Trust, the Supreme Court is expected to resolve the circuit split, and may 
ultimately provide clarity for whistleblowers and employers regarding 
the meaning of “whistleblower” under the definitional section of 21F of 
 
 8  Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 9  Id. at 1049. 
 10  Brief for the Petitioner on petition for certiorari at 2, Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 
16-1276, August 24, 2017. 
 11  Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 12  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 145 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 13  Aaron Vehling, Dodd Frank Whistleblower Battle Won’t Hit High Court, LAW 360 
(Nov. 12, 2015, 7:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/726167/ 
dodd-frank-whistleblower-battle-won-t-hit-the-high-court. 
 14  Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 644 (E.D. Tenn. 
2015), aff’d, 676 F. App’x. 421 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1348 (mem.) (Mar. 
20, 2017) (No. 16-946). 
 15  Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 676 F. App’x. 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 16  Id. 
GRANT 2017 
4 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1 
Dodd-Frank17 and its meaning within the anti-retaliation provision of that 
section.18 
Whatever the Supreme Court ultimately decides in Digital Realty 
Trust,19 the outcome may presage more changes to come for the 
whistleblower regulatory scheme and have broader implications for 
future judicial review of the interpretation of statutes made by federal 
agencies.  Some legal commentators and scholars suggest that a decision 
in favor of Digital Realty could officially foreclose Dodd-Frank as an 
avenue of recovery for whistleblowers who only reported illegal activity 
internally to management, and not to the SEC.20  Others predict that 
reaffirming the lower court decision in favor of Somers risks 
transforming the whistleblower protections under Sarbanes-Oxley, and 
other statutes under the jurisdiction of the SEC, into vestigial regulations, 
dwarfed by the more attractive legal and monetary incentives of Dodd-
Frank.21  Could the fear of a deluge of Dodd-Frank claims be an 
additional justification for ramping up the promulgation of regulatory 
limits to Dodd-Frank under the Congressional Review Act,22 and 
encourage immediate action by the Senate on the Financial Choice Act 
(“FCA”),23 currently pending in Congress and aimed at, among other 
things, reducing the number of whistleblower claims under Dodd-Frank? 
Perhaps, more far reaching, is whether the Supreme Court’s 
forthcoming decision in Digital Realty Trust will be a further indication 
of a paradigm shift.  The Supreme Court may use Digital Realty Trust to 
move away from using a decidedly textualist method of statutory 
interpretation and giving deference to agency interpretations of law, á la 
Chevron24 and Brand X,25 to resolve the perceived infirmities of 
Congressional statutes.  In particular, the Supreme Court has frequently 
 
 17  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
 18  § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
 19  Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 20  See, e.g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 17, Digital Realty v. Somers, 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 15-17352) 2017 WL 3913767. 
 21  See, e.g., Brief for the Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, at 5, Digital Realty v. Somers, 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-17352) 
2017 WL2391512. 
 22  Congressional Review Act: Congress Dusts Off Old Oversight Weapon, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congressional-review-act-congress-
dusts-old-oversight-weapon. 
 23  Financial Choice Act, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 828 (2017). 
 24  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837 
(1984). 
 25  National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Svcs. 545 U.S. 967, 
967 (2005). 
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spurned the Chevron deference framework in several major cases 
involving agency statutory interpretations, with some justices adopting a 
more limited view of executive agency legislative powers.  Indeed, 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, the newest addition to the Supreme Court, has 
criticized Chevron, as interpreted in Brand X, as “a judge made doctrine 
for the abdication of judicial duty.”26 
This Article explores the possible impact of the Supreme Court’s 
forthcoming decision in Digital Realty Trust.  Part II identifies the 
statutory provisions at issue and examines how courts have interpreted 
the term “whistleblower” under the anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-
Frank.  Part III discusses the issues that will likely be squarely before the 
Court in Digital Realty Trust and surveys the broader implications of this 
case with respect to whistleblower protections and statutory 
interpretation.  Part IV examines the potential ramifications of the Digital 
Realty Trust decision for whistleblowers and employers, taking into 
consideration the potential for future regulatory “reform” aimed at 
weakening or eliminating Dodd-Frank.  Part V concludes. 
II. THE LOWER COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTIONS UNDER DODD- FRANK 
A. Whistleblower Protections under Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank 
Several years before Dodd-Frank, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200227 in response to a series of major corporate scandals.  
The corporate misdeeds of companies such as Enron and WorldCom 
arose primarily from the manipulation of financial statements and a lack 
of adequate regulatory oversight.28  Sarbanes-Oxley sought to restore 
investor confidence and limit the possibility of fraudulent corporate 
financial reporting by implementing strict reforms establishing “internal 
controls” and mandating heightened financial disclosures.29  The statute’s 
provisions also sought to empower whistleblowers to report employer 
misconduct internally, or externally to a “federal regulatory or law 
enforcement agency,”30 by providing protections against retaliation. 
A few years later, Congress was again motivated to pass additional 
 
 26  Guitierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 27  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 28  Andrew Ceresney, Co-Director of the Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Address at American Law Institute Continuing Legal Education: 
Financial Reporting and Accounting Fraud (Sept. 19, 2013). 
 29  Id. 
 30  18 U.S.C § 1514A(a)(1)(A). 
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legislation after the financial crisis of 2008.  In 2010, Congress passed 
Dodd-Frank31 in response to calls for greater transparency, accountability 
and reform in the financial crisis.  Comprising 848 pages, Dodd-Frank’s 
scope includes sixteen areas of reform, including the Volcker Rule, 
creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Financial 
Stability and Oversight Council, revised capital and liquidity 
requirements for banks and other depository institutions, regulation of 
over-the-counter derivatives legislation, and liquidation and the provision 
of liquidation authority to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.32 
Dodd-Frank did not repeal Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower 
protections, but instead added new incentives and protections for 
whistleblowers.33  To expand regulatory oversight and increase market 
stability, Dodd-Frank amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by, 
inter alia, adding Section 21F, entitled “Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protection.”34  While Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley 
each have whistleblower reporting and anti-retaliation provisions, Dodd-
Frank goes beyond the inherent benefits of corporate virtue to incentivize 
compliance by providing substantial monetary rewards for individuals 
who come forward with original information regarding fraud, 
misconduct, or other illegal activity.  Those awards are available if a 
successful enforcement action results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 
million.35 
Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley seek to protect whistleblowers 
from various forms of employer retaliation, thereby encouraging such 
insiders to come forward with information regarding fraud and securities 
violations.  However, although Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley share 
essentially the same goal, the statutes differ, particularly with respect to 
the availability of a private cause of action for employer retaliation, the 
length of the statutes of limitations, available remedies and the definition 
of whistleblower. 
Dodd-Frank provides a private cause of action for anti-retaliation 
claims whereby a whistleblower can file a claim directly in federal court, 
and allows the SEC to pursue a retaliation claim on behalf of the 
whistleblower.36  On the other hand, under Sarbanes-Oxley, a 
 
 31  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 32  Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 33  OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2017 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, at 4 (2017). 
 34  Id. 
 35  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (b). 
 36  OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2017 
GRANT 2017 
2017] CAUTION, CURVES AHEAD 7 
whistleblower is required to exhaust administrative remedies, by filing an 
administrative complaint with the Department of Labor (“DOL”)37 and 
may bring a suit in federal court only if the Secretary of Labor does not 
issue a decision within 180 days of filing.38  In contrast to the 180-day 
statute of limitations of Sarbanes-Oxley,39 a Dodd-Frank claim may be 
brought six years after the violation occurs, or even as long as ten years 
later, depending on the date of discovery of facts material to the claim.40  
Furthermore, whereas, Sarbanes-Oxley’s retaliation provision provides 
for remedies “necessary to make the employee whole” which includes 
reinstatement, back-pay, attorneys’ fees, and special damages for non-
economic harm resulting from the retaliation,41 generally, Dodd-Frank 
remedies are limited to compensatory damages.  However, in contrast to 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank remedies include double back-pay.42 
Apart from the differences in procedure and remedies, there is a 
difference between Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank regarding the scope 
of protection afforded to whistleblowers.  That difference is the subject 
of current judicial debate and the focus of this Article.  The anti-
retaliation provision in Sarbanes-Oxley appears to define whistleblower 
more broadly than Dodd-Frank, by extending anti-retaliation protections 
to both internal and external reporters.43  That is, protection is provided 
to an employee who reports or provides information to: 
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; 
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; 
or 
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or 
such other person working for the employer who has the 
authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).44 
By contrast, Dodd-Frank’s explicit language under subsection 
21F(a)(6) defines whistleblower to mean “any individual who provides, 
or two or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information 
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission. . .” 
(emphasis added).45  However, subsection 21F(h)(A) prohibits retaliatory 
 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, at 19 
(2017). 
 37  Responsibility for Sarbanes-Oxley complaints was delegated to the Assistant 
Secretary for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) and thus the 
complaints are received and investigated by OSHA.  67 FR 64272 (Oct. 17, 2002). 
 38  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1). 
 39  § 1514A(b)(2)(D). 
 40  § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii). 
 41  § 1514A(c). 
 42  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).  
 43  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
 44  § 1514A(a)(1). 
 45  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(s)(6). 
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actions by employers 
against a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the 
whistleblower— 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance 
with this section; 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation 
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based 
upon or related to such information; or  
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.) the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), this 
chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title, section 
1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.46 
Thus, the language in the definition of whistleblower, as set forth in 
subsection 21F(a)(6), requires external reporting of securities violations 
to the SEC, but the language of 21F(h)(A)(iii) suggests that an individual 
may be protected for making disclosures “required or protected” under 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the provisions of which extend protection to 
whistleblowers who only report internally.  The SEC, in a regulation47 
and an interpretive release,48 as well as numerous amicus curiae briefs, 
has taken the position that internal reporting is protected under Dodd-
Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions.  Nonetheless, as discussed below, 
there currently exists a divide in the district courts and a split among the 
Fifth, Second and Ninth Circuits on this question.  The lack of clarity 
creates confusion for employers as to potential liability, and for 
employees as to the regulatory protections available to them.  
Whistleblowers who have only reported the misdeeds of their employers 
internally have experienced inconsistent results establishing their claims 
under Dodd-Frank. 
B. The Circuit Split 
Since its enactment, the federal courts have focused on the 
inconsistency in Section 21F of Dodd-Frank, with several district courts 
pre-Asadi49 attempting to interpret and reconcile the two sections of the 
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.  Many of those courts, albeit for 
reasons different than those ultimately rejected in Asadi, determined that 
plaintiffs who have only reported internally are protected under Dodd-
 
 46  § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
 47  17 C.F.R. § 250.21F-2. 
 48  See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules Under Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-75592 (Aug. 4, 2015). 
 49  Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 620 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions.50 
The district court’s decision in Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., was the 
first case that dealt with ambiguities in the Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
provisions.  In Egan,51 the district court for the Southern District of New 
York held that the whistleblower provisions could be harmonized by 
reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(A)(iii) “as a narrow exception to 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who reports to the 
SEC.”52  Thus, a plaintiff could state a whistleblower claim under Dodd-
Frank either by alleging that he reported to the SEC or “that his 
disclosures fell under the four categories of disclosures delineated by 
[subsection (iii)] that do not require such reporting: those under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Securities Exchange Act, . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1213 
(e), or other laws and regulations subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.”53  
Ultimately, the court held that Egan’s disclosures did not fit under any of 
these categories, and in particular, not under Sarbanes-Oxley because his 
employer was not a publicly traded company.54 
In 2011, the SEC attempted to harmonize the provisions of Section 
21F of Dodd-Frank by enacting Rule 21F-2,55 which provided separate 
definitions of “whistleblower” for the anti-retaliation and awards 
provisions.  For purposes of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision, 
subsection (b) of the rule provides that an individual is a “whistleblower” 
if, inter alia, the individual provides information in a manner described 
in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (h)(1)(A),”56  whether or not that individual 
“satisf[ies] the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an 
award.”57  By contrast, the definition of a “whistleblower” who qualifies 
for an award requires reporting to the SEC in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in other parts of the rule.58  Thus, the SEC clearly 
took the position that internal reporters were protected against retaliation 
under Dodd-Frank.  Nevertheless, the courts remained split on the issue. 
i. Asadi 
In contrast to several earlier district court decisions, the Fifth Circuit, 
 
 50  See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015); see also 
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2. 
 51  Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
 52  Id. at *5. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. at *5-7. 
 55  17 C.F.R. § 240.21 F-2. 
 56  § 240.21F-2(b)(ii). 
 57  § 240.21F-2(b)(iii). 
 58  § 240.21F-2(a). 
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in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),59 held that an insider who only reported 
internally was not protected under the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-
Frank.  Asadi, an executive at General Electric Energy, reported 
suspected bribery in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
internally, to his supervisor and the company ombudsman.60  In alleged 
retaliation, Asadi subsequently received a negative performance review 
and was ultimately fired from his position.61  The district court declined 
to address the definition of “whistleblower,” choosing instead to dismiss 
Asadi’s claim based on the lack of extraterritorial reach of the Dodd-
Frank anti-retaliation provision.62  However, the Fifth Circuit focused on 
interpreting the statute using its plain language, eschewing SEC guidance 
and the purpose behind the statute itself.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
lower court’s ruling that Asadi was not a whistleblower under Dodd-
Frank, finding that the statutory provisions in question “clearly and 
unambiguously”63 defined whistleblower.  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the plain language of Dodd-Frank “creates a private cause of 
action only for individuals who provide information relating to a violation 
of the securities laws to the SEC.”64 
In assessing the statutory language, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the statute as written only contemplated one category of whistleblower as 
set forth in the definitional section.65  The other three categories refer to 
protected activity and did not “define which individuals qualify as 
whistleblowers.”66  The Fifth Circuit suggested that this interpretation 
flows from the plain language as to prohibited employer activity 
pertaining to whistleblowers engaging in any of the three categories of 
protected actions.67  Therefore, the statutory language of 15 U.S.C.§ 78u-
6(h)(1)(A), in the Fifth Circuit’s estimation, is clear and unambiguous 
insofar as it answers two questions “(1) who is protected and (2) what 
actions by protected individuals constitute protected activity.”68 
The answer to the first question, the Fifth Circuit found, is that the 
section protects “whistleblowers,” as defined in the statute.69  As to the 
 
 59  730 F.3d 620 (5th Cir 2013) 
 60  Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, No 12-20522, 2012 WL 2522599 at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
June 28, 2012). 
 61  Id. at *2. 
 62  Id. at *4-6. 
 63  Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 64  Id. at 623. 
 65  Id. at 625. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. at 625-26. 
 68  Id. at 624. 
 69  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624. 
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second question, subsections (i), (ii), and (iii) delineate the protected 
activities.  That is, subsection (i) protects whistleblowers for the reason 
that makes them whistleblowers, i.e., that they have provided information 
to the SEC; subsection (ii) protects whistleblowers who participate in an 
investigation or proceeding; and subsection (iii) protects whistleblowers 
who make disclosures required or protected under any law, rule or 
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, including Sarbanes-
Oxley.70 
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the position asserted by Asadi, that 
while subsection (iii), by itself, is not ambiguous, it conflicts with the 
definition of “whistleblower” by creating a situation where an individual 
could engage in the protected activity of the subsection, yet not qualify 
as a whistleblower.  That result, according to the Fifth Circuit did “not 
render [subsection (iii)] conflicting or superfluous.”71 
In terms of who is protected, the Fifth Circuit declined to read 
subsection (iii) as creating a conflicting definition of whistleblower under 
the plain language of subsection (iii). The plain text, according to the 
Fifth Circuit, did not demonstrate an intention by the drafters to create 
three additional categories of whistleblowers.  The Fifth Circuit, in noting 
Congress’ use of the term whistleblower throughout the statute, suggested 
that, had Congress used the terms “individual” or “employee,” it might 
have been swayed otherwise.72 
Turning to the canons of statutory construction, the linchpin of 
textualist statutory interpretation, the Fifth Circuit determined that the 
interaction between the subsections did not make subsection (iii) 
superfluous, as it is meant to protect whistleblowers from retaliation, not 
based on reporting to the SEC, but from reprisals by the employer arising 
from the whistleblower’s required or protected disclosures under 
Sarbanes-Oxley and other statutes within the SEC’s jurisdictional 
reach.73  The Fifth Circuit posited a situation involving simultaneous 
reporting where the whistleblower reports internally and to the SEC.  
Retaliation occurs by the employer based on the internal reporting, of 
which the employer is aware, and not based on the external report to the 
SEC, of which the employer is not aware.  In such a situation (which one 
might assume happens infrequently), the court suggested that subsection 
(iii) provides protection to the whistleblower, because he also reported 
externally to the SEC.74 
 
 70  Id. at 625-26. 
 71  Id. at 626. 
 72  Id. at 626-27.  
 73  Id. at 627. 
 74  Id. at 627-28. 
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In finding the relevant provisions unambiguous, the Fifth Circuit 
managed to sidestep the issue of Chevron deference.75  Nonetheless, it 
examined the SEC regulations and concluded that those regulations were 
“inconsistent.”76  The Fifth Circuit noted that the SEC had adopted a 
definition of “whistleblower” which included those who have only 
reported internally, while other regulations expressly required that the 
original information be reported to the SEC by one of the methods 
provided in the regulations.77  The Fifth Circuit also suggested that 
extending the definition of whistleblower beyond the plain reading of the 
statute risked making the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision moot.  
A whistleblower might, observed the Fifth Circuit, choose Dodd-Frank 
over Sarbanes-Oxley, due to the latter’s larger monetary damages awards, 
longer statute of limitations and the absence of a requirement for federal 
administrative agency exhaustion prior to bringing a claim in court.78 
The Fifth Circuit also criticized the SEC for administrative agency 
overreach for not actually clarifying or interpreting the plain text of the 
Dodd-Frank provisions in question, but rather, redefining and broadening 
the definition of whistleblower to essentially read “to the commission” 
out of the definition.79  Thereby, the SEC sought to provide Dodd-Frank 
protection to an individual even if he “never reports any information to 
the SEC, so long as he has undertaken the activity listed,80 and eliminated 
what the Fifth Circuit viewed as a significant distinction between Dodd-
Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provisions. 
ii. Berman 
The Southern District of New York, in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, 
LLC, followed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi.  In Berman, the 
Southern District of New York adhered to the Fifth Circuit’s plain 
meaning interpretation of the provision to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for 
failure to “adequately allege that he is a whistleblower within the 
meaning of Dodd-Frank.”81  Berman, an accountant, sued his employer 
for retaliation under Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley, when he was fired 
after reporting improper accounting practices to his employer.  On appeal, 
the Second Circuit, rejecting the lower court’s reasoning, determined that 
Berman was indeed a whistleblower entitled to protection under the anti-
 
 75  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630. 
 76  Id.  
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. at 629-30. 
 79  Id. at 629. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank.  Consequently, the Second 
Circuit’s decision on this issue created a circuit split.82 
The Second Circuit, although largely relying on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in King v. Burwell,83 did not address the plain meaning 
of the statutory provisions, opting instead to frame the issue as whether 
“the arguable tension” between the definitional section and subsection 
(iii) of the anti-retaliation provision “creates sufficient ambiguity as to 
the coverage of subdivision (iii) to oblige us to give Chevron deference 
to the SEC rule.”84 
Although finding no “direct” conflict between the SEC notification 
requirement in the definition of whistleblower and subsection (iii), the 
Second Circuit was still critical of the Fifth Circuit’s harmonization of 
the provisions in Asadi.  The Second Circuit found that the example in 
Asadi, of simultaneous reporting, even if plausible, failed to fully redress 
the issue, leaving an “unresolved tension” between the provisions.85  
Moreover, the Second Circuit found that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation 
would give subdivision (iii) a very limited scope since few 
whistleblowers would likely engage in simultaneous reporting and some 
potential whistleblowers—particularly auditors and attorneys who are 
expressly and impliedly referenced in (iii)—were bound by statute and 
ethical duties to make reports of employer misconduct internally in the 
first instance.86 
The Second Circuit, similar to the Fifth Circuit, rejected the 
superfluous argument, but placed the blame on the process itself in which 
bills in Congress are sometimes hastily put together without proper 
reconciliation of all of the inherent parts.87  According to the Second 
Circuit in Berman, under these circumstances, where the text is unclear 
and given the “tension” between the statute’s provisions, Chevron 
deference to the SEC’s interpretation of the statute is warranted.88  Thus, 
Berman was entitled to pursue Dodd-Frank remedies despite not having 
reported to the SEC prior to his termination. 
Not so, said Judge Jacobs, who in a scathing dissent to Berman’s 
majority opinion, sided with the Fifth Circuit in Asadi.  Judge Jacobs 
found no support for the majority’s application of Chevron deference 
simply because “a plain reading of a statutory provision gives it an 
 
 82  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 83  King v. Burwell 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2480 (2015). 
 84  Berman, 801 F.3d at 148. 
 85  Id. at 151. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 154-55. 
 88  Id. at 155. 
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extremely limited effect.”89  The dissent admonished the majority for 
straying beyond their judicial authority and their obligation “to apply 
congressional statutes as written.”90  The dissent noted that the majority 
opinion did very little to address the plain meaning of the statute.  Judge 
Jacobs accused the majority of judicial overreaching by deferring to the 
SEC’s interpretation of the provision, which interpreted “to the 
commission” out of the statute91 and inserted the more general term 
“employee,” where Dodd-Frank expressly refers to “whistleblowers.”92  
In finding that administrative deference was appropriate, the majority 
relied only on the first prong of Chevron, requiring a finding of 
ambiguity.  The majority’s finding of “arguable tension” is based on the 
conclusion that the natural reading of the statutory text would leave 15 
U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) with “extremely limited scope.  In Judge 
Jacob’s view, however, a plain reading of the provisions together, which 
creates a limited scope of protection, does not, in and of itself, indicate 
ambiguity.93 
Judge Jacobs asserted that, beyond its finding of ambiguity, the 
majority failed to acknowledge that Congress could have intentionally 
placed limitations on the reach of Dodd-Frank, through the definitional 
section, one means for “limiting the meaning of statutory text.”94  By 
implication, what appears to the majority to be statutory infirmity brought 
about by Congressional ineptitude in providing “little, if any” protections 
to lawyers and auditors who report violations, may have been an 
intentional determination by Congress to provide no additional incentives 
for such actors to meet their professional and ethical obligations.95  
Further, Judge Jacobs noted that the U.S. Code is replete with statutes and 
provisions that have an “extremely limited” effect.96 
Lastly, and perhaps most relevant to the Supreme Court’s future 
decision in Digital Realty, is the dissent’s discussion of the majority’s 
overreliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell97 to 
incorrectly support the majority’s decision to eschew a textualist inquiry 
into the plain meaning in favor of a purposive interpretation.  The dissent 
argued that Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO,98 which was decided ten days 
 
 89  Id. at 158. 
 90  Berman, 801 F.3d at 155. 
 91  Id. at 155. 
 92  Id. at 157-58. 
 93  Id. at 158. 
 94  Id. at 156. 
 95  Id. at 159. 
 96  Berman, 801 F.3d at 158-59. 
 97  King v. Burwell 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2480 (2015). 
 98  Baker Botts LLP, v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2158 (2015). 
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before King v. Burwell, is a continuation of the Supreme Court’s 
textualist statutory interpretation jurisprudence.99  Thus, the dissent 
argued, the result in King v. Burwell, which resulted from the “unusual 
circumstances” of the case, does not support a paradigm shift away from 
an examination of the plain statutory text.100  Although a plain reading of 
the text leads to the exclusion of whistleblowers who only report 
internally from Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection, according to 
Judge Jacobs, this is not an untenable result, because those very same 
whistleblowers would have Sarbanes-Oxley protection.101  Further, the 
dissent points out the irony in King v. Burwell, in which the Supreme 
Court noted that, if Congress intended a limitation, they would have done 
so in the definitional section, suggesting that this is the case in Berman.102 
After initially seeking a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, 
Neo@Ogilvy, LLC, decided that it would not pursue higher review.103 
iii. Digital Realty Trust 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust104 
deepened the split between the circuit courts.  On June 26, 2017, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust105 in 
a move lauded by many because of the likelihood that the decision will 
provide much needed clarification on a significant issue under the Dodd-
Frank whistleblower scheme. 
Somers, employed as a Vice President by Digital Realty, alleged, 
among other claims, that he was dismissed from his position, in violation 
of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions, for making internal reports 
of securities misdeeds by his employer.  The Northern District of 
California denied Digital Realty’s motion to dismiss Somers’ Dodd-
Frank whistleblower claim, on the ground that SEC Rule 21F-2(b)(1) was 
entitled to Chevron deference.106 
The Northern District of California, adopting a textualist approach, 
found the statute was ambiguous by examining both the overall structure 
and the specific context in which the language of the subsections are used, 
paying particular attention to the application of the surplusage and 
 
 99  Berman, 801 F.3d at 159. 
 100  Id. at 159-60. 
 101  Id.at 159. 
 102  Id. at 160. 
 103  Aaron Vehling, Dodd Frank Whistleblower Battle Won’t Hit High Court, LAW 360 
(Nov. 12, 2015, 7:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/726167/dodd-frank- 
whistleblower-battle-won-t-hit-the-high-court. 
 104  Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 105  Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 137 S. Ct. 2300, 2300 (2017). 
 106  Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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harmonious-reading interpretive canons.  The Northern District of 
California concluded the whistleblower definition would render 
subsection (iii) superfluous because portions of subsection (iii), such as 
those relevant to attorneys and auditors, contemplate internal reporting 
and exhaustion of internal compliance procedures before any external 
reporting.107  Moreover, the application of the whistleblower definition to 
the anti-retaliation provision would also make the “to the commission” 
language in (i) and (ii) superfluous because, under a narrow reading, the 
only person who can be a whistleblower is someone who reports “to the 
commission.”108 
The Northern District of California also supported the ambiguity of 
the provisions because “different usage can have different meanings,” to 
wit, (i) and (ii) make reference “to the commission,” whereas, the lack of 
such language in (iii) may be indicative of Congressional intent not to 
require SEC reporting in that particular subsection.109  The Northern 
District of California, faced with what it determined to be two 
“reasonable” interpretations of the interplay between the statutes, found 
sufficient ambiguity to satisfy step one of Chevron.110 
Moving on to step two of Chevron, the Northern District of 
California determined that the application of the SEC’s clarifying 
regulation was permissible.  On the one hand, the lack of legislative 
history in connection with subsection (iii), combined with the fact that it 
was a last minute addition to the provision, according to the court, 
reflected Congressional intent to expand the scope of the section, which, 
prior to subsection (iii), unambiguously required external reporting to the 
SEC.111  On the other hand, there was no indication of legislative history 
suggesting that Congress “purposefully” sought to limit the Dodd-Frank 
anti-retaliation protections to whistleblowers who only report externally 
to the SEC.112  Not surprisingly, given the fact that most other courts that 
have reached this step of the test have concluded that SEC Rule 21-F-
2(b)(i) was a “reasonable” construction of the statute, the district court 
found that step two of Chevron had been satisfied. 
The Ninth Circuit, hearing the case on interlocutory appeal, ruled, in 
a 2-1 decision, that the term “whistleblower” extends protection to 
employees making internal disclosures of alleged unlawful activity, and 
does not limit protection under Dodd-Frank to employees reporting 
 
 107  Id. at 1100-02. 
 108  Id. at 1102-03. 
 109  Id. at 1103. 
 110  Id. at 1104-05. 
 111  Id. at 1103.  
 112  Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1103. 
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potential violations to the SEC.113  The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the 
lower court’s analysis and decision, ultimately agreeing that deference to 
the SEC’s interpretation was warranted.  While clearly noting a lack of 
legislative history concerning subsection (iii), the court nonetheless 
determined that the language of the provision “illuminate[d] 
Congressional intent” to bar retaliation under Dodd-Frank against 
employees reporting internally under Sarbanes-Oxley.114  In the absence 
of such protection, brought about by a narrow reading of subsection (iii), 
the court concluded, employees who are required to report internally, 
such as attorneys and auditors, would have no protection between the 
period of internal reporting and reporting to the Commission.115 
The Ninth Circuit shifted its attention to a broader question: the 
appropriate application of definitions to statutes.  In other words, whether 
a definition imports its meaning to the entire statute or is subject to change 
based on the context.  Drawing upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 
King v. Burwell,116 the Ninth Circuit, adopting reasoning similar to the 
Second Circuit, determined that the definitional subsection of Dodd-
Frank was not dispositive of the statute’s scope.117  The Ninth Circuit 
cited King v. Burwell for the proposition that the use of a term in one part 
of a statute “may mean a different thing” in a different part of the statute 
depending on the context.118  The Ninth Circuit further stated that a 
narrow reading of Dodd-Frank does not make “practical sense and 
undercut[s] Congressional intent.”119 
The Ninth Circuit, in agreement with the Berman court, implicitly 
rejected Asadi’s simultaneous-reporting hypothetical.120  The Ninth 
Circuit pointed out that such a reading would reduce subsection (iii) to 
the “point of absurdity,” providing protection only to whistleblowers who 
simultaneously report possible securities violations both internally and 
externally, and the  employer, without knowledge of the SEC report, fires 
the employee on the basis of the knowledge of the internal report.121  
According to the Ninth Circuit, without knowledge of the report to the 
SEC, the whistleblower would not be able to satisfy the causality required 
between knowledge of the SEC report and the alleged retaliation in 
 
 113  Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 114  Id. at 1049. 
 115  Id. 
 116  135 S.Ct. 2480, 2480 (2015). 
 117  Somers, 850 F. 3d at 1049. 
 118  Id.  In a terse dissenting opinion, Justice Owens rejects this view, distinguishing the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in King v. Burwell, from the case at bar.  Id. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 1049-50. 
 121  Id. 
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response.  The Court also rejected the arguments made by Digital Realty 
Trust (and the court in Asadi) that a narrow reading of the provision 
would moot the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank.122 
Having determined that the invocation of Chevron deference was 
appropriate, the Ninth Circuit then turned to the seventy-four page amicus 
curiae brief submitted by the SEC, which asserted, based on limited 
evidence, that some whistleblowers, who prefer a different process from 
Dodd-Frank, would still file claims under Sarbanes-Oxley.123  The Ninth 
Circuit also suggested that the ease of adjudication with the DOL leading 
the investigation, as well as the availability of special damages, might 
make the enforcement mechanism under Sarbanes-Oxley preferable to 
that of Dodd-Frank.124 
iv. Other Decisions 
Subsequent to the split between the Fifth, Second, and Ninth 
Circuits, the issue of the statutory interpretation of the whistleblower 
provisions has arisen in other circuit courts.  In Verble v. Morgan Stanley 
Smith Barney LLC, the district court held that the employee was not a 
whistleblower because he failed to report to the SEC.125  The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
claim, but did so without reaching the question of the statutory 
ambiguity.126  Instead, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the claim based on the 
failure to state a “plausible claim” for relief.127  In March 2017, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the former Morgan Stanley 
employee’s claims that he was entitled to whistleblower protection, 
despite his failure to report his complaints to the SEC.128 
In 2015, in Duke v. Prestige Cruises Int’l, Inc.,129  the district court 
ruled that an employee who was discharged after reporting fraud 
internally, but not to the SEC, did not have a valid claim under Dodd-
Frank’s anti-retaliation provision.130  The district court dismissed the 
employee’s Dodd-Frank claim with prejudice, but the Eleventh Circuit 
stayed the plaintiff’s appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
 122  Id. at 1050. 
 123  Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae  in Support of the 
Appellee, at 36, Somers v. Digital Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-
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 124  Somers, 850 F. 3d at 1050. 
 125  148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 656 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) 
 126  Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 676 F. App’x. 421, 426 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 127  Id. at 427. 
 128  Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 137 S.Ct. 1348 (2017). 
 129  No. 14-23017-Civ-King, 2015 WL 4886088 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2015). 
 130  Id. at *3. 
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Digital Realty.131 
In April 2017, the Third Circuit, in Danon v. Vanguard Group, took 
up the Dodd-Frank retaliation claim of a tax lawyer who reported various 
violations of tax and corporate laws to his employers.132  The district court 
originally dismissed the case for failure to adequately plead sufficient 
facts indicating a causal connection between the employer’s knowledge 
and the employee’s termination.133  The Third Circuit ultimately 
remanded the case, allowing the Dodd-Frank claim to go forward.134  
Before making its decision, the district court will likely wait for the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Digital Realty case. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Digital Realty will likely depend 
on how it chooses to resolve the apparent tension between the Dodd-
Frank provisions, given the lack of certainty with respect to the Court’s 
preferred method of statutory interpretation and the future of Chevron 
deference.  While petitioner Digital Realty asserts this case poses “a 
simple question of statutory interpretation,”135 this is not necessarily the 
case as the Court must resolve once and for all, the complexities of its 
role as the “interpreter in chief” of Congressional legislation.  More 
broadly, for the Court to reach a decision in Digital Realty, a renewed 
examination of the debate regarding the textualist versus purposivist 
theories of legislative interpretation is likely unavoidable. 
Foregoing the “traditional” textualist statutory analysis, the Second 
and Ninth Circuits relied heavily on King v. Burwell, a case in which the 
Supreme Court justified giving Congressional purpose primacy over 
canonical statutory interpretation.136  To reach its decision in Digital 
Realty, the Supreme Court will no doubt be forced to resolve some of the 
issues left open by King v. Burwell.  Therefore, part of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of Digital Realty will opine on the scope of the doctrine 
of administrative deference under Chevron137 and as modified by Brand 
X138 which, while often cited, is applied inconsistently.  For example, a 
 
 131  No. 16-15426-V (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2017). 
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study conducted by Professor William Eskridge, Jr. revealed that the 
courts often do not apply deference in cases where Chevron should 
apply.139  In addition, the justices will likely be compelled to assert (or 
reassert) the appropriate role that the Supreme Court should play with 
respect to statutory interpretation in the absence of a clear expression of 
Congressional intent.  Until the case is heard, however, questions remain 
as to how the Court will decide Digital Realty and what potential impact 
this decision will have on future whistleblowers? 
A. Textualism and the Roberts Court 
Although reputedly textualist, the current Supreme Court led by 
Chief Justice John Roberts, has recently decided cases based on a line of 
reasoning that suggests a shift in its method of statutory interpretation.  
Arguably, in cases, such as Bond v. United States,140 Utility Air 
Regulatory Group v. EPA,141 Yates v. United States,142 and King v. 
Burwell,143  the Supreme Court’s analysis focused on the purpose of the 
statute and Congress’s overarching intent, in order to resolve issues 
concerning statutory meaning.  This contrasts with the Supreme Court’s 
former diligent parsing and application of canonical precepts to the 
statute’s text.  Notably, the courts in Berman and Digital Realty relied on 
King v. Burwell for this very sentiment—that Congressional purpose 
trumps plain meaning.144 
In King, the Supreme Court grappled with an interpretive issue 
regarding whether, under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), tax credits 
are available in states that have a federal exchange rather than a state 
exchange.145  The ACA requires the creation of an insurance “exchange” 
in each state and indicates that the exchange may be established by the 
state or, in the event the state chooses not to do so, by the federal 
government.146  The ACA also provides, pursuant to the Internal Revenue 
Code, that tax credits be provided to certain individuals enrolled in “an 
 
unless prior precedent held the statute unambiguous). 
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 141  See 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014). 
 142  See 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081-82 (2015). 
 143  See 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). 
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 146  42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90). 
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exchange established by the state to help subsidize the cost” of health 
insurance.147  A subsequent Internal Revenue Service regulation 
interpreted “exchange established by the state” to mean that tax credits 
are available to individuals participating in exchanges in states that have 
either a state or federally established and operated exchange.148 
In King, the Court conceded the plain meaning of the statute would 
in the “natural sense” indicate that an exchange created by the state does 
not include exchanges established by the federal government.149  
However, it declined to apply that meaning.150  Moreover, the Court 
recognized ambiguity in the phrase “established by the state,” step one 
under a Chevron analysis, but refused to apply Chevron, deciding instead 
that it could not have been Congress’s intention to “assign a question of 
deep economic and political significance” to an agency, such as the IRS, 
which has no expertise in “crafting health care insurance.”151  Further, the 
Court asserted that if Congress had in fact had this intention, it would 
have expressly stated so.152  Ultimately, the Court’s decision in King 
rested not on an interpretation of the text or administrative agency 
deference, but on the legislative purpose of the statute.153 
Not surprisingly, the decision in King is not without its critics.  
Dissenters in King, Berman, and Digital Reality, for their part, make 
decidedly similar arguments.  Each point out the inadequacies of the 
majority’s statutory interpretation,154 and, in the case of Digital Realty, 
warns the Ninth Circuit of the danger in relying too heavily on King v. 
Burwell.155 
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the dissenting opinion in King.  In 
his unabashedly textualist and originalist fashion, Justice Scalia, joined 
by Justices Thomas and Alito, castigated the majority for attempting to 
save the Affordable Care Act at the expense of a “natural reading” of the 
statute.156  Ultimately, Justice Scalia questioned whether the judicial 
branch should serve the role of assisting Congress in rewriting legislation 
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when it encounters statutes that the courts themselves describe as 
examples of “inartful drafting”157 and products of a lack of oversight.158  
In Justice Scalia’s view, if one is to perceive Congress as a competent 
branch of government that is capable of writing coherent legislation, the 
legislature should be taken at its word.159 The judiciary can assume such 
legislation “means what it looks to mean” and to the extent it does not, it 
should be sent back to Congress for revision.160  It is “not the Court’s 
“place to judge the quality of the care and deliberation” that goes into a 
law as it is binding on the court just the same.161  Furthermore, “much 
less is it [the Court’s] place to make everything come out right when 
Congress does not do its job properly.”162  However, if such statements 
are taken as true, then what role, if any, is there for the courts to play in 
fixing legislation that Congress has expressed imperfectly? 
One solution is for Congress to pass legislation revising judicial 
opinions.  In October 2017, in the latest attempt to reform the health-
insurance market, President Donald Trump, through executive order, 
eliminated the subsidies on both state and federal exchanges, thereby 
mooting the key issue in King v. Burwell.  Nonetheless, the issues of 
statutory interpretation presented in King remain relevant for the 
Supreme Court to address.  To wit, it will need to clarify whether the King 
decision was intended to be a special case, a proverbial “one-off,” or an 
indication of an ideological shift. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s broad application of its reasoning 
in King to Digital Realty would run counter to Digital Reality’s 
arguments.  In its brief, Digital Realty argued that the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision was inconsistent with the plain text of the Dodd-Frank Act, as 
well as its structure and history.163  Digital Realty asserted that the 
decision violated a foundational principle of statutory interpretation, that, 
“where a statute includes an express definition of a term, courts and 
agencies may not invent a different definition.”164  However, in King, this 
is exactly what the Supreme Court did.165  In support of Digital Realty, 
the amicus briefs coalesced around Digital Realty’s argument that the 
plain meaning of the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank only 
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protects whistleblowers who report externally to the SEC.166 
On the other hand, the adoption of a purely textualist interpretation 
of the provision, similar to Asadi, would favor a narrow reading of Dodd-
Frank’s anti-retaliation provision.  Such an interpretation would foreclose 
protections under Dodd-Frank for internal whistleblowers who do not 
report to the SEC and could signal a return to the Supreme Court’s 
textualist roots.  Either way, the Supreme Court in Digital Reality must 
consider, with respect to separation of powers, whether Chevron 
deference should give executive agencies the final say in the 
interpretation of legislation. 
B. Chevron is Dead! Long Live Chevron! 
Digital Realty provides yet another opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to address the elephant in the room,”167 administrative deference 
under Chevron.  The Supreme Court will be compelled to address the 
scope and meaning of Chevron’s framework.  The 1984 decision might 
be ripe for reconsideration, especially in light of the Court’s recent 
addition of Justice Neil Gorsuch, one of the doctrines most vocal and 
prolific critics.  Is Chevron a judicial mandate or a precedent that serves 
as a justification for the abdication of judicial responsibility?  Clearly, 
Chevron is “strong medicine . . . requir[ing] courts to accept any agency 
interpretation that is reasonable, even if it is not the interpretation that the 
court finds most plausible.”168  If Chevron was ever once considered a 
core principle of administrative law,169 it is no longer settled judicial 
doctrine. 
Under the modern judicial regime, a court may or may not invoke 
Chevron deference.  The notion that a reviewing court must defer to a 
federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that an 
agency administers has been criticized as undermining judicial review.  
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Such deference is said to deprive the courts of the role of the final arbiter 
of what a statute means and to threaten the separation of powers by 
allowing the executive branch to redraft and construe federal statutes, and 
promote the exercise of “delegated legislative policymaking authority in 
what looks like a judicial proceeding.”170 
The Supreme Court, when facing an interpretive issue, has, in some 
cases, done an end run around Chevron either by creating an exception, 
finding no ambiguity or applying a purposive interpretive methodology.  
The Ninth Circuit, in reaching its decision in Digital Realty, relied on the 
SEC’s 2015 published interpretation of the anti-retaliation provisions, in 
which the SEC stated: 
[I]f read in isolation Rule 21F-9(a) could be construed to 
require that an individual must report to the Commission 
before he or she will qualify as a whistleblower eligible for 
the employment retaliation protections provided by Section 
21F, that construction is not consistent with Rule 21F-2 and 
would undermine our overall goals in implementing the 
whistleblower program171 . . . [W]e are issuing this 
interpretation to clarify that, for purposes of Section 21F’s 
employment retaliation protections, an individual’s status as 
a whistleblower does not depend on adherence to the 
reporting procedures specified in Rule 21F-9(a).172 
According to the SEC’s broader interpretation, whistleblowers can sue 
under the Dodd-Frank Act even if they did not report directly to the 
SEC.173  Therefore, the application of Chevron deference would result in 
protection under subsection (iii) for both internal and external 
whistleblowers. 
The Supreme Court’s composition will determine the future of 
Chevron.  While Justice Roberts and Kennedy have acted as the swing 
votes in a number of major cases triggering Chevron deference, Justices 
Thomas and Alito have historically spurned the idea of Chevron 
deference.174  At its inception, Justice Scalia defended the Chevron 
doctrine as an accurate reflection of Congressional intent, recognizing the 
need for deference to agency expertise.”175  However, Justice Scalia’s 
later opinions, such as King v. Burwell, suggest a recognition that the 
application of the Chevron doctrine can raise concerns as to the 
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separation of powers.  To this point, Justice Gorsuch, who was presumed 
to fill the textualist and Constitutionalist role left open by the death of 
Justice Scalia, is decidedly anti-Chevron. 
Justice Gorsuch has made it clear that he is vehemently opposed to 
Chevron.  In his confirmation hearings, when questioned about Chevron 
deference, Justice Gorsuch clearly expressed his due process and 
separation of powers concerns with respect to Chevron and expressed 
what he perceived as the dangers of placing bureaucracies above “neutral, 
dispassionate judges.”176  Writing from the bench of the Tenth Circuit in 
Guitierrrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, for example, Justice Gorsuch not only 
authored the majority opinion, but provided a nine-page concurrence in 
which he urged a reconsideration of Chevron and Brand X by the 
Supreme Court.177  In his view, these decisions “permit executive 
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative 
power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a 
little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.  
Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”178 
It is also unclear what Justice Gorsuch’s role will be on the Court, 
having aligned himself to the right of most of his colleagues and 
exhibiting a tendency to issue independent opinions, as opposed to 
joining with the Court, much to the dismay of Chief Justice Roberts.179  
Justice Gorsuch’s views regarding Chevron and the role he plays on the 
Roberts Court will likely have significant implications for the decision in 
Digital Realty.  This is especially likely if Justice Gorsuch is able to sway 
the other Justices, some of whom are already questioning the continuing 
viability of Chevron deference. 
The Regulatory Accountability Act (“RAA”)180 that is on the floor 
of the House of Representatives and currently pending in the Senate, is 
another threat to Chevron.  In as much as Chevron may be blamed for the 
creation of a large and expensive administrative state, antithetical to the 
Republican Party’s proposed goal of widespread national deregulation, 
the RAA could potentially eliminate Chevron deference.  Under the 
RAA, courts are required to “decide de novo all relevant questions of law, 
including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
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rules made by agencies.”181  In the event a court finds a gap or ambiguity 
in the statute, the court “shall not interpret or rely on that gap or ambiguity 
as: (1) an implicit delegation to the agency of legislative rulemaking 
authority, or (2) a justification for interpreting agency authority 
expansively or for deferring to the agency’s interpretation on the question 
of law.”182 
IV. IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS AND FUTURE WHISTLEBLOWERS 
The Court’s decision in Digital Realty will have significant 
implications for employers and potential whistleblowers.  For employers, 
a decision by the Supreme Court to expand the definition of 
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank to include internal reporters could 
potentially leave them vulnerable to Dodd-Frank claims long after the 
employee has separated from the company due to Dodd-Frank’s longer 
six to ten-year statute of limitations.  Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which requires an exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing 
a claim in federal court, Dodd-Frank’s private right of action allows 
claims that might not have otherwise gone to court to be brought in 
federal court.  Of course, while this should mean increased protections 
under Dodd-Frank for whistleblowers who report internally, some 
suggest that this could also have a negative impact on the virility of 
corporate compliance programs, and in turn, the protections available to 
internal whistleblowers under those programs. 
Corporate compliance programs, required for publicly traded 
companies under Sarbanes-Oxley, are an important part of a larger 
regulatory scheme, put in place to curb wrongdoing of employees, 
managers and officers by increasing oversight and accountability through 
the implementation of a series of internal controls.  While there are 
obvious benefits for employees seeking Dodd-Frank anti-relation 
protections after choosing to report employer misconduct through 
corporate compliance programs, the refusal of companies to protect their 
internal whistleblowers from retaliation is essentially an attack on the 
legitimacy and authority of their own internal reporting systems, in an 
effort to stave off Dodd-Frank claims.  Cases like Asadi and other legal 
precedents could further incentivize whistleblowers to skip the internal 
compliance program altogether and instead report directly to the SEC. 
If the Supreme Court decides the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation 
provisions do not extend protection to internal whistleblowers, it could 
have a devastating impact on those employees who have lost their jobs as 
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a result of reporting misconduct to managers and relied on Dodd-Frank’s 
longer statute of limitations.  Whistleblowers with cases pending prior to 
the Digital Realty decision would likely be dismissed for failure to state 
a cause of action.  However, regardless of the Supreme Court’s 
determination concerning Dodd-Frank, potential whistleblowers who are 
either required to or choose to report internally may still have a viable 
claim against adverse employment actions under Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-
retaliation provisions. 
Finally, the expansion of the definition of whistleblower could 
impact the future of Dodd-Frank.  Recently, the House of Representatives 
passed the Financial Choice Act (“FCA”).183  The FCA’s provisions seek, 
among other things, a reduction in the number of whistleblowers eligible 
to receive awards for reporting employer misconduct to the SEC by 
preventing whistleblowers involved in any wrongdoing from collecting 
awards.184  Dodd-Frank currently prevents whistleblowers convicted of 
criminal conduct related to the reported fraud from collecting 
whistleblower awards.  Although, the FCA is still pending before the 
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committees, it has been 
viewed by some as the initial shot across the bow towards Dodd-Frank’s 
repeal.  And while the SEC has vowed to continue to implement the 
whistleblower incentive act, a veritable run on whistleblower claims 
could be just the impetus to spur additional immediate efforts towards the 
repeal of Dodd-Frank. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The complexities of Digital Realty will require the Supreme Court 
to revisit a number of issues that may have initially been thought of as 
firmly decided.  The Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Digital 
Realty will potentially provide guidance for employers and 
whistleblowers, but there could be much further reaching implications for 
both sides no matter how the Court rules.  In addition, there is uncertainty 
surrounding how the current Republican administration, which has 
expressed a desire to eliminate Dodd-Frank, has committed to rolling 
back Obama era legislation, and has taken steps toward deregulation in a 
number of areas, will alter the Supreme Court’s decision.  Currently, it 
cannot be said with any degree of certainty how the Supreme Court will 
decide Digital Realty or what the potential effect of the decision will be 
on whistleblower provisions in other U.S. statutes or legislation in other 
countries.  At least for the time being however, while Dodd-Frank may 
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not be the picture of clarity, the most cogent advice for employers is 
simple—do not retaliate against whistleblowers! 
 
